Tag Archive for: Cyber

Don’t Wanna Pay Ransom Gangs? Test Your Backups.

Browse the comments on virtually any story about a ransomware attack and you will almost surely encounter the view that the victim organization could have avoided paying their extortionists if only they’d had proper data backups. But the ugly truth is there are many non-obvious reasons why victims end up paying even when they have done nearly everything right from a data backup perspective.

This story isn’t about what organizations do in response to cybercriminals holding their data for hostage, which has become something of a best practice among most of the top ransomware crime groups today. Rather, it’s about why victims still pay for a key needed to decrypt their systems even when they have the means to restore everything from backups on their own.

Experts say the biggest reason ransomware targets and/or their insurance providers still pay when they already have reliable backups is that nobody at the victim organization bothered to test in advance how long this data restoration process might take.

“In a lot of cases, companies do have backups, but they never actually tried to restore their network from backups before, so they have no idea how long it’s going to take,” said Fabian Wosar, chief technology officer at Emsisoft. “Suddenly the victim notices they have a couple of petabytes of data to restore over the Internet, and they realize that even with their fast connections it’s going to take three months to download all these backup files. A lot of IT teams never actually make even a back-of-the-napkin calculation of how long it would take them to restore from a data rate perspective.”

Wosar said the next most-common scenario involves victims that have off-site, encrypted backups of their data but discover that the digital key needed to decrypt their backups was stored on the same local file-sharing network that got encrypted by the ransomware.

The third most-common impediment to victim organizations being able to rely on their backups is that the ransomware purveyors manage to corrupt the backups as well.

“That is still somewhat rare,” Wosar said. “It does happen but it’s more the exception than the rule. Unfortunately, it is still quite common to end up having backups in some form and one of these three reasons prevents them from being useful.”

Bill Siegel, CEO and co-founder of Coveware, a company that negotiates ransomware payments for victims, said most companies that pay either don’t have properly configured backups, or they haven’t tested their resiliency or the ability to recover their backups against the ransomware scenario.

“It can be [that they] have 50 petabytes of backups … but it’s in a … facility 30 miles away.… And then they start [restoring over a copper wire from those remote backups] and it’s going really slow … and someone pulls out a calculator and realizes it’s going to take 69 years [to restore what they need],” Siegel told Kim Zetter, a veteran Wired reporter who recently launched a cybersecurity newsletter on Substack.

“Or there’s lots of software applications that you actually use to do a restore, and some of these applications are in your network [that got] encrypted,” Siegel continued. “So you’re like, ‘Oh great. We have backups, the data is there, but the application to actually do the restoration is encrypted.’ So there’s all these little things that can trip you up, that prevent you from doing a restore when you don’t practice.”

Wosar said all organizations need to both test their backups and develop a plan for prioritizing the restoration of critical systems needed to rebuild their network.

“In a lot of cases, companies don’t even know their various network dependencies, and so they don’t know in which order they should restore systems,” he said. “They don’t know in advance, ‘Hey if we get hit and everything goes down, these are the services and systems that are priorities for a basic network that we can build off of.’”

Wosar said it’s essential that organizations drill their breach response plans in periodic tabletop exercises, and that it is in these exercises that companies can start to refine their plans. For example, he said, if the organization has physical access to their remote backup data center, it might make more sense to develop processes for physically shipping the backups to the restoration location.

“Many victims see themselves confronted with having to rebuild their network in a way they didn’t anticipate. And that’s usually not the best time to have to come up with these sorts of plans. That’s why tabletop exercises are incredibly important. We recommend creating an entire playbook so you know what you need to do to recover from a ransomware attack.”

Microsoft Patch Tuesday, July 2021 Edition

Microsoft today released updates to patch at least 116 security holes in its Windows operating systems and related software. At least four of the vulnerabilities addressed today are under active attack, according to Microsoft.

Thirteen of the security bugs quashed in this month’s release earned Microsoft’s most-dire “critical” rating, meaning they can be exploited by malware or miscreants to seize remote control over a vulnerable system without any help from users.

Another 103 of the security holes patched this month were flagged as “important,” which Microsoft assigns to vulnerabilities “whose exploitation could result in compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of user data, or of the integrity or availability of processing resources.”

Among the critical bugs is of course the official fix for the PrintNightmare print spooler flaw in most versions of Windows (CVE-2021-34527) that prompted Microsoft to rush out a patch for a week ago in response to exploit code for the flaw that got accidentally published online. That patch seems to have caused a number of problems for Windows users. Here’s hoping the updated fix resolves some of those issues for readers who’ve been holding out.

CVE-2021-34448 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the scripting engine built into every supported version of Windows — including server versions. Microsoft says this flaw is being exploited in the wild.

Both CVE-2021-33771 and CVE-2021-31979 are elevation of privilege flaws in the Windows kernel. Both are seeing active exploitation, according to Microsoft.

Chad McNaughton, technical community manager at Automox, called attention to CVE-2021-34458, a remote code execution flaw in the deepest areas of the operating system. McNaughton said this vulnerability is likely to be exploited because it is a “low-complexity vulnerability requiring low privileges and no user interaction.”

Another concerning critical vulnerability in the July batch is CVE-2021-34494, a dangerous bug in the Windows DNS Server that earned a CVSS score (severity) of 9.8 out of a possible 10.

“Both core and full installations are affected back to Windows Server 2008, including versions 2004 and 20H2,” said Aleks Haugom, also with Automox.

“DNS is used to translate IP addresses to more human-friendly names, so you don’t have to remember the jumble of numbers that represents your favorite social media site,” Haugom said. “In a Windows Domain environment, Windows DNS Server is critical to business operations and often installed on the domain controller. This vulnerability could be particularly dangerous if not patched promptly.”

Microsoft also patched six vulnerabilities in Exchange Server, an email product that has been under siege all year from attackers. Satnam Narang, staff research engineer at Tenable, noted that while Microsoft says two of the Exchange bugs tackled this month (CVE-2021-34473 and CVE-2021-34523) were addressed as part of its security updates from April 2021, both CVEs were somehow omitted from that April release. Translation: If you already applied the bevy of Exchange updates Microsoft made available in April, your Exchange systems have protection against these flaws.

Other products that got patches today include Microsoft Office, Bing, SharePoint Server, Internet Explorer, and Visual Studio. The SANS Internet Storm Center as always has a nice visual breakdown of all the patches by severity.

Adobe also issued security updates today for Adobe Acrobat and Reader, as well as Dimension, Illustrator, Framemaker and Adobe Bridge.

Chrome and Firefox also recently have shipped important security updates, so if you haven’t done so recently take a moment to save your tabs/work, completely close out and restart the browser, which should apply any pending updates.

The usual disclaimer:

Before you update with this month’s patch batch, please make sure you have backed up your system and/or important files. It’s not uncommon for Windows updates to hose one’s system or prevent it from booting properly, and some updates even have been known to erase or corrupt files.

So do yourself a favor and backup before installing any patches. Windows 10 even has some built-in tools to help you do that, either on a per-file/folder basis or by making a complete and bootable copy of your hard drive all at once.

And if you wish to ensure Windows has been set to pause updating so you can back up your files and/or system before the operating system decides to reboot and install patches on its own schedule, see this guide.

As always, if you experience glitches or problems installing any of these patches this month, please consider leaving a comment about it below; there’s a better-than-even chance other readers have experienced the same and may chime in here with some helpful tips. Also, check out AskWoody, which keeps a close eye out for specific patches that may be causing problems for users.

Spike in “Chain Gang” Destructive Attacks on ATMs

Last summer, financial institutions throughout Texas started reporting a sudden increase in attacks involving well-orchestrated teams that would show up at night, use stolen trucks and heavy chains to rip Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) out of their foundations, and make off with the cash boxes inside. Now it appears the crime — known variously as “ATM smash-and-grab” or “chain gang” attacks — is rapidly increasing in other states.

Four different ATM “chain gang” attacks in Texas recently. Image: Texas Bankers Association.

The Texas Bankers Association documented at least 139 chain gang attacks against Texas financial institutions in the year ending November 2020. The association says organized crime is the main source of the destructive activity, and that Houston-based FBI officials have made more than 50 arrests and are actively tracking about 250 individuals suspected of being part of these criminal rings.

From surveillance camera footage examined by fraud investigators, the perpetrators have followed the same playbook in each incident. The bad guys show up in the early morning hours with a truck or tractor that’s been stolen from a local construction site.

Then two or three masked men will pry the front covering from the ATM using crowbars, and attach heavy chains to the cash machine. The canisters of cash inside are exposed once the crooks pull the ATM’s safe door off using the stolen vehicle.

In nearly all cases, the perpetrators are done in less than five minutes.

Tracey Santor is the bond product manager for Travelers, which insures a large number of financial institutions against this type of crime. Santor said investigators questioning some of the suspects learned that the smash-and-grabs are used as a kind of initiation for would-be gang members.

“One of the things they found out during the arrest was the people wanting to be in the gang were told they had to bring them $250,000 within a week,” Santor said. “And they were given instructions on how to do it. I’ve also heard of cases where the perpetrators put construction cones around the ATM so it looks to anyone passing by that they’re legitimately doing construction at the site.”

Santor said the chain gang attacks have spread to other states, and that in the year ending June 2021 Travelers saw a 257 percent increase in the number of insurance claims related to ATM smash-and-grabs.

That 257 percent increase also includes claims involving incidents where attackers will crash a stolen car into a convenience store, and then in the ensuing commotion load the store’s ATM into the back of the vehicle and drive away.

In addition to any cash losses — which can often exceed $200,000 — replacing destroyed ATMs and any associated housing can take weeks, and newer model ATMs can cost $80,000 or more.

“It’s not stopping,” Santor said of the chain gang attacks. “In the last year we counted 32 separate states we’ve seen this type of attack in. Normally we are seeing single digits across the country. 2021 is going to be the same or worse for us than last year.”

Increased law enforcement scrutiny of the crime in Texas might explain why a number of neighboring states are seeing a recent uptick in the number of chain gang attacks, said Elaine Dodd, executive vice president of the fraud division for the Oklahoma Bankers Association.

“We have a lot of it going on here now and they’re getting good at it,” Dodd said. “The numbers are surging. I think since Texas has focused law enforcement attention on this it’s spreading like fingers out from there.”

Chain gang members at work on a Texas bank ATM. Image: Texas Bankers Association.

It’s not hard to see why physical attacks against ATMs are on the rise. In 2019, the average amount stolen in a traditional bank robbery was just $1,797, according to the FBI.

In contrast, robbing ATMs is way less risky and potentially far more rewarding for the perpetrators. That’s because bank ATMs can typically hold hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash.

Dodd said she hopes to see more involvement from federal investigators in fighting chain gang attacks, and that it would help if more of these attacks were prosecuted as bank robberies, which can carry stiff federal penalties. As it is, she said, most incidents are treated as property crimes and left to local investigators.

“We had a rash of three attacks recently and contacted the FBI, and were told, ‘We don’t work these,’” Dodd said. “The FBI looks at these attacks not as bank robbery, but just the theft of cash.”

In January, Texas lawmakers are introduced legislation that would make destroying an ATM a third degree felony offense. Such a change would mean chain gang members could be prosecuted with the same zeal Texas applies to people who steal someone’s livestock, a crime which is punishable by 2-10 years in prison and a fine of up to $10,000 (or both).

“The bottom line is, right now bank robbery is a felony and robbing an unattended ATM is not,” Santor said.

KrebsOnSecurity checked in with the European ATM Security Team (EAST), which maintains statistics about fraud of all kinds targeting ATM operators in Europe. EAST Executive Director Lachlan Gunn said overall physical attacks on ATMs in Europe have been a lot quieter since the pandemic started.

“Attacks fell right away during the lockdowns and have started to pick up a little as the restrictions are eased,” Gunn said. “So no major spike here, although [the United States is] further ahead when it comes to the easing of restrictions.”

Gunn said the most common physical attacks on European ATMs continue to involve explosives —  such as gas tanks and solid explosives that are typically stolen from mining and construction sites.

“The biggest physical attack issue in Europe remains solid explosive attacks, due to the extensive collateral damage and the risk to life,” Gunn said.

The Texas Bankers Association report, available here (PDF), includes a number of recommended steps financial institutions can take to reduce the likelihood of being targeted by chain gangs.

Kaseya Left Customer Portal Vulnerable to 2015 Flaw in its Own Software

Last week cybercriminals deployed ransomware to 1,500 organizations, including many that provide IT security and technical support to other companies. The attackers exploited a vulnerability in software from Kaseya, a Miami-based company whose products help system administrators manage large networks remotely. Now it appears Kaseya’s customer service portal was left vulnerable until last week to a data-leaking security flaw that was first identified in the same software six years ago.

On July 3, the REvil ransomware affiliate program began using a zero-day security hole (CVE-2021-30116) to deploy ransomware to hundreds of IT management companies running Kaseya’s remote management software — known as the Kaseya Virtual System Administrator (VSA).

According to this entry for CVE-2021-30116, the security flaw that powers that Kaseya VSA zero-day was assigned a vulnerability number on April 2, 2021, indicating Kaseya had roughly three months to address the bug before it was exploited in the wild.

Also on July 3, security incident response firm Mandiant notified Kaseya that their billing and customer support site —portal.kaseya.net — was vulnerable to CVE-2015-2862, a “directory traversal” vulnerability in Kaseya VSA that allows remote users to read any files on the server using nothing more than a Web browser.

As its name suggests, CVE-2015-2862 was issued in July 2015. Six years later, Kaseya’s customer portal was still exposed to the data-leaking weakness.

The Kaseya customer support and billing portal. Image: Archive.org.

Mandiant notified Kaseya after hearing about it from Alex Holden, founder and chief technology officer of Milwaukee-based cyber intelligence firm Hold Security. Holden said the 2015 vulnerability was present on Kaseya’s customer portal until Saturday afternoon, allowing him to download the site’s “web.config” file, a server component that often contains sensitive information such as usernames and passwords and the locations of key databases.

“It’s not like they forgot to patch something that Microsoft fixed years ago,” Holden said. “It’s a patch for their own software. And it’s not zero-day. It’s from 2015!”

The official description of CVE-2015-2862 says a would-be attacker would need to be already authenticated to the server for the exploit to work. But Holden said that was not the case with the vulnerability on the Kaseya portal that he reported via Mandiant.

“This is worse because the CVE calls for an authenticated user,” Holden said. “This was not.”

Michael Sanders, executive vice president of account management at Kaseya, confirmed that the customer portal was taken offline in response to a vulnerability report. Sanders said the portal had been retired in 2018 in favor of a more modern customer support and ticketing system, yet somehow the old site was still left available online.

“It was deprecated but left up,” Sanders said.

In a written statement shared with KrebsOnSecurity, Kaseya said that in 2015 CERT reported two vulnerabilities in its VSA product.

“We worked with CERT on responsible disclosure and released patches for VSA versions V7, R8, R9 and R9 along with the public disclosure (CVEs) and notifications to our customers. Portal.kaseya.net was not considered by our team to be part of the VSA shipping product and was not part of the VSA product patch in 2015. It has no access to customer endpoints and has been shut down – and will no longer be enabled or used by Kaseya.”

“At this time, there is no evidence this portal was involved in the VSA product security incident,” the statement continued. “We are continuing to do forensic analysis on the system and investigating what data is actually there.”

The REvil ransomware group said affected organizations could negotiate independently with them for a decryption key, or someone could pay $70 million worth of virtual currency to buy a key that works to decrypt all systems compromised in this attack.

But Sanders said every ransomware expert Kaseya consulted so far has advised against negotiating for one ransom to unlock all victims.

“The problem is that they don’t have our data, they have our customers’ data,” Sanders said. “We’ve been counseled not to do that by every ransomware negotiating company we’ve dealt with. They said with the amount of individual machines hacked and ransomwared, it would be very difficult for all of these systems to be remediated at once.”

In a video posted to Youtube on July 6, Kaseya CEO Fred Voccola said the ransomware attack had “limited impact, with only approximately 50 of the more than 35,000 Kaseya customers being breached.”

“While each and every customer impacted is one too many, the impact of this highly sophisticated attack has proven to be, thankfully, greatly overstated,” Voccola said.

The zero-day vulnerability that led to Kaseya customers (and customers of those customers) getting ransomed was discovered and reported to Kaseya by Wietse Boonstra, a researcher with the Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD).

In a July 4 blog post, DIVD’s Victor Gevers wrote that Kaseya was “very cooperative,” and “asked the right questions.”

“Also, partial patches were shared with us to validate their effectiveness,” Gevers wrote. “During the entire process, Kaseya has shown that they were willing to put in the maximum effort and initiative into this case both to get this issue fixed and their customers patched. They showed a genuine commitment to do the right thing. Unfortunately, we were beaten by REvil in the final sprint, as they could exploit the vulnerabilities before customers could even patch.”

Still, Kaseya has yet to issue an official patch for the flaw Boonstra reported in April. Kaseya told customers on July 7 that it was working “through the night” to push out an update.

Gevers said the Kaseya vulnerability was discovered as part of a larger DIVD effort to look for serious flaws in a wide array of remote network management tools.

“We are focusing on these types of products because we spotted a trend where more and more of the products that are used to keep networks safe and secure are showing structural weaknesses,” he wrote.

Microsoft Issues Emergency Patch for Windows Flaw

Microsoft on Tuesday issued an emergency software update to quash a security bug that’s been dubbed “PrintNightmare,” a critical vulnerability in all supported versions of Windows that is actively being exploited. The fix comes a week ahead of Microsoft’s normal monthly Patch Tuesday release, and follows the publishing of exploit code showing would-be attackers how to leverage the flaw to break into Windows computers.

At issue is CVE-2021-34527, which involves a flaw in the Windows Print Spooler service that could be exploited by attackers to run code of their choice on a target’s system. Microsoft says it has already detected active exploitation of the vulnerability.

Satnam Narang, staff research engineer at Tenable, said Microsoft’s patch warrants urgent attention because of the vulnerability’s ubiquity across organizations and the prospect that attackers could exploit this flaw in order to take over a Windows domain controller.

“We expect it will only be a matter of time before it is more broadly incorporated into attacker toolkits,” Narang said. “PrintNightmare will remain a valuable exploit for cybercriminals as long as there are unpatched systems out there, and as we know, unpatched vulnerabilities have a long shelf life for attackers.”

In a blog post, Microsoft’s Security Response Center said it was delayed in developing fixes for the vulnerability in Windows Server 2016, Windows 10 version 1607, and Windows Server 2012. The fix also apparently includes a new feature that allows Windows administrators to implement stronger restrictions on the installation of printer software.

“Prior to installing the July 6, 2021, and newer Windows Updates containing protections for CVE-2021-34527, the printer operators’ security group could install both signed and unsigned printer drivers on a printer server,” reads Microsoft’s support advisory. “After installing such updates, delegated admin groups like printer operators can only install signed printer drivers. Administrator credentials will be required to install unsigned printer drivers on a printer server going forward.”

Windows 10 users can check for the patch by opening Windows Update. Chances are, it will show what’s pictured in the screenshot below — that KB5004945 is available for download and install. A reboot will be required after installation.

Friendly reminder: It’s always a good idea to backup your data before applying security updates. Windows 10 has some built-in tools to help you do that, either on a per-file/folder basis or by making a complete and bootable copy of your hard drive all at once.

Microsoft’s out-of-band update may not completely fix the PrinterNightmare vulnerability. Security researcher Benjamin Delpy posted on Twitter that the exploit still works on a fully patched Windows server if the server also has Point & Print enabled — a Windows feature that automatically downloads and installs available printer drivers.

Delpy said it’s common for organizations to enable Point & Print using group policies because it allows users to install printer updates without getting approval first from IT.

This post will be updated if Windows users start reporting any issues in applying the patch.

Another 0-Day Looms for Many Western Digital Users

Some of Western Digital’s MyCloud-based data storage devices. Image: WD.

Countless Western Digital customers saw their MyBook Live network storage drives remotely wiped in the past month thanks to a bug in a product line the company stopped supporting in 2015, as well as a previously unknown zero-day flaw. But there is a similarly serious zero-day flaw present in a much broader range of newer Western Digital MyCloud network storage devices that will remain unfixed for many customers who can’t or won’t upgrade to the latest operating system.

At issue is a remote code execution flaw residing in all Western Digital network attached storage (NAS) devices running MyCloud OS 3, an operating system the company only recently stopped supporting.

Researchers Radek Domanski and Pedro Ribeiro originally planned to present their findings at the Pwn2Own hacking competition in Tokyo last year. But just days before the event Western Digital released MyCloud OS 5, which eliminated the bug they found. That update effectively nullified their chances at competing in Pwn2Own, which requires exploits to work against the latest firmware or software supported by the targeted device.

Nevertheless, in February 2021, the duo published this detailed YouTube video, which documents how they discovered a chain of weaknesses that allows an attacker to remotely update a vulnerable device’s firmware with a malicious backdoor — using a low-privileged user account that has a blank password.

The researchers said Western Digital never responded to their reports. In a statement provided to KrebsOnSecurity, Western Digital said it received their report after Pwn2Own Tokyo 2020, but that at the time the vulnerability they reported had already been fixed by the release of My Cloud OS 5.

“The communication that came our way confirmed the research team involved planned to release details of the vulnerability and asked us to contact them with any questions,” Western Digital said. “We didn’t have any questions so we didn’t respond. Since then, we have updated our process and respond to every report in order to avoid any miscommunication like this again. We take reports from the security research community very seriously and conduct investigations as soon as we receive them.”

Western Digital ignored questions about whether the flaw found by Domanski and Ribeiro was ever addressed in OS 3. A statement published on its support site March 12, 2021 says the company will no longer provide further security updates to the MyCloud OS 3 firmware.

“We strongly encourage moving to the My Cloud OS5 firmware,” the statement reads. “If your device is not eligible for upgrade to My Cloud OS 5, we recommend that you upgrade to one of our other My Cloud offerings that support My Cloud OS 5. More information can be found here.” A list of MyCloud devices that can support OS 5 is here.

But according to Domanski, OS 5 is a complete rewrite of Western Digital’s core operating system, and as a result some of the more popular features and functionality built into OS3 are missing.

“It broke a lot of functionality,” Domanski said of OS 5. “So some users might not decide to migrate to OS 5.”

In recognition of this, the researchers have developed and released their own patch that fixes the vulnerabilities they found in OS 3 (the patch needs to be reapplied each time the device is rebooted). Western Digital said it is aware of third parties offering security patches for My Cloud OS 3.

“We have not evaluated any such patches and we are unable to provide any support for such patches,” the company stated.

A snippet from the video showing the researchers uploading their malicious firmware via a remote zero-day flaw in MyCloud OS 3.

Domanski said MyCloud users on OS 3 can virtually eliminate the threat from this attack by simply ensuring that the devices are not set up to be reachable remotely over the Internet. MyCloud devices make it super easy for customers to access their data remotely, but doing so also exposes them to attacks like last month’s that led to the mass-wipe of MyBook Live devices.

“Luckily for many users they don’t expose the interface to the Internet,” he said. “But looking at the number of posts on Western Digital’s support page related to OS3, I can assume the userbase is still considerable. It almost feels like Western Digital without any notice jumped to OS5, leaving all the users without support.”

Dan Goodin at Ars Technica has a fascinating deep dive on the other zero-day flaw that led to the mass attack last month on MyBook Live devices that Western Digital stopped supporting in 2015. In response to Goodin’s report, Western Digital acknowledged that the flaw was enabled by a Western Digital developer who removed code that required a valid user password before allowing factory resets to proceed.

Facing a backlash of angry customers, Western Digital also pledged to provide data recovery services to affected customers starting this month. “MyBook Live customers will also be eligible for a trade-in program so they can upgrade to MyCloud devices,” Goodin wrote. “A spokeswoman said the data recovery service will be free of charge.”

If attackers get around to exploiting this OS 3 bug, Western Digital might soon be paying for data recovery services and trade-ins for a whole lot more customers.

Intuit to Share Payroll Data from 1.4M Small Businesses With Equifax

Financial services giant Intuit this week informed 1.4 million small businesses using its QuickBooks Online Payroll and Intuit Online Payroll products that their payroll information will be shared with big-three consumer credit bureau Equifax starting later this year unless customers opt out by the end of this month.

Intuit says the change is tied to an “exciting” and “free” new service that will let millions of small business employees get easy access to employment and income verification services when they wish to apply for a loan or line of credit.

“In early fall 2021, your QuickBooks Online Payroll subscription will include an automated income and employment verification service powered by The Work Number from Equifax,” reads the Intuit email, which includes a link to the new Terms of Service. “Your employees may need to verify their income and employment info when applying for things like loans, credit, or public aid. Before, you likely had to manually provide this info to lenders, creditors or government agencies. These verifications will be automated by The Work Number, which helps employees get faster approvals and saves you time.”

An Intuit spokesperson clarified that the new service is not available through QuickBooks Online or to QuickBooks Online users as a whole. Intuit’s FAQ on the changes is here.

Equifax’s 2017 megabreach that exposed the personal and financial details of 145.5 million Americans may have shocked the public, but it did little to stop more than a million employers from continuing to sell Equifax their employee payroll data, Bloomberg found in late 2017.

“The workforce-solutions unit is now among Equifax’s fastest-growing businesses, contributing more than a fifth of the firm’s $3.1 billion of revenue last year,” wrote Jennifer Surane. “Using payroll data from government agencies and thousands of employers — including a vast majority of Fortune 500 companies — Equifax has cultivated a database of 300 million current and historic employment records, according to regulatory filings.”

QuickBooks Online user Anthony Citrano posted on Twitter about receiving the notice, noting that the upcoming changes had yet to receive any attention in the financial or larger media space.

“The way I read the terms, Equifax gets to proactively collect all payroll data just in case they need to share it later — similar to how they already handle credit reporting,” said Citrano, who is founder and CEO of Acquicent, a company that issues non-fungible tokens (NFTs). “And that feels like a disaster waiting to happen, especially given Equifax’s history.”

In selling payroll data to Equifax, Intuit will be joining some of the world’s largest payroll providers. For example, ADP — the largest payroll software provider in the United States — has long shared payroll data with Equifax.

But Citrano said this move by Intuit will incorporate a large number of fairly small businesses.

“ADP participates in some way already, but QuickBooks Online jumping on the bandwagon means a lot of employees of small to mid-sized businesses are going to be affected,” he said.

Why might small businesses want to think twice before entrusting Equifax with their payroll data? The answer is the company doesn’t have a great track record of protecting that information.

In the days following the 2017 breach at Equifax, KrebsOnSecurity pointed out that The Work Number made it a little too easy for anyone to learn your salary history. At the time, all you needed to view someone’s entire work and salary history was their Social Security number and date of birth. It didn’t help that for roughly half the U.S. population, both pieces of information were known to be in the possession of criminals behind the breach.

Equifax responded by taking down its Work Number website until it was able to include additional authentication requirements, saying anyone could opt out of Equifax revealing their salary history.

Equifax’s security improvements included the addition of four multiple-guess questions whose answers were based on publicly-available data. But these requirements were easily bypassed, as evidenced by a previous breach at Equifax’s employment division.

The Work Number is a user-paid verification of employment database created by TALX Corp., a data broker acquired by Equifax in 2007. Four months before the epic 2017 breach became public, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that fraudsters who specialize in tax refund fraud had been successfully guessing the answers to those secret questions to reset TALX account PINs, which then let them view past W-2 tax forms for employees at many Fortune 500 companies.

Intuit says affected customers that do not want this new service included must update their preferences and opt-out by July 31, 2021. Otherwise, they will be automatically will be opted in. According to Intuit, customers can opt out by following these steps:

1. Sign in to QuickBooks Online Payroll.

2. Go to Payroll Settings.

3. In the Shared data section, select the pencil and uncheck the box.

4. Select Save.

We Infiltrated a Counterfeit Check Ring! Now What?

Imagine waking up each morning knowing the identities of thousands of people who are about to be mugged for thousands of dollars each. You know exactly when and where each of those muggings will take place, and you’ve shared this information in advance with the authorities each day for a year with no outward indication that they are doing anything about it. How frustrated would you be?

A counterfeit check image [redacted] that was intended for a person helping this fraud gang print and mail phony checks tied to a raft of email-based scams. One fraud-fighting group is intercepting hundreds to thousands of these per day.

Such is the curse of the fraud fighter known online by the handles “Brianna Ware” and “B. Ware” for short, a longtime member of a global group of volunteers who’ve infiltrated a cybercrime gang that disseminates counterfeit checks tied to a dizzying number of online scams.

For the past year, B. Ware has maintained contact with an insider from the criminal group that’s been sending daily lists of would-be victims who are to receive counterfeit checks printed using the real bank account information of legitimate companies.

“Some days we’re seeing thousands of counterfeit checks going out,” B. Ware said.

The scams used in connection with the fraudulent checks vary widely, from fake employment and “mystery shopper” schemes to those involving people who have been told they can get paid to cover their cars in advertisements (a.k.a. the “car wrap” scam).

A form letter mailed out with a counterfeit check urges the recipient to text a phone number after the check has been deposited.

Most of the counterfeit checks being disseminated by this fraud group are in amounts ranging from $2,500 to $5,000. The crimes that the checks enable are known variously as “advanced fee” scams, in that they involve tricking people into making payments in anticipation of receiving something of greater value in return.

But in each scheme the goal is the same: Convince the recipient to deposit the check and then wire a portion of the amount somewhere else. A few days after the check is deposited, it gets invariably canceled by the organization whose bank account information was on the check. And then person who deposited the phony check is on the hook for the entire amount.

“Like the car wrap scam, where they send you a check for $5,000, and you agree to keep $1,000 for your first payment and send the rest back to them in exchange for the car wrap materials,” B. Ware said. “Usually the check includes a letter that says they want you to text a specific phone number to let them know you received the check. When you do that, they’ll start sending you instructions on how and where to send the money.”

A typical confirmation letter that accompanies a counterfeit check for a car wrap scam.

Traditionally, these groups have asked recipients to transit money via wire transfer. But these days, B. Ware said, the same crooks are now asking people to forward the money via mobile applications like CashApp and Venmo.

B. Ware and other volunteer fraud fighters believe the fake checks gang is using people looped into phony employment schemes and wooed through online romance scams to print the counterfeit checks, and that other recruits are responsible for mailing them out each day.

“More often than not, the scammers creating the shipping labels will provide those to an unwitting accomplice, or the accomplice is told to log in to an account and print the labels,” B. Ware explained.

Often the counterfeit checks and labels forwarded by B. Ware’s informant come with notes attached indicating the type of scam with which they are associated.

“Sometimes they’re mystery shopper scams, and other times it’s overpayment for an item sold on Craigslist,” B. Ware said. “We don’t know how the scammers are getting the account and routing numbers for these checks, but they are drawn on real companies and always scan fine through a bank’s systems initially. The recipients can deposit them at any bank, but we try to get the checks to the banks when we can so they have a heads up.”

SHRINKING FROM THE FIREHOSE?

Roughly a year ago, B. Ware’s group started sharing its intelligence with fraud investigators at FedEx and the U.S. Postal Service — the primary delivery mechanisms for these counterfeit checks.

Both the USPS and FedEx have an interest in investigating because the fraudsters in this case are using stolen shipping labels paid for by companies who have no idea their FedEx or USPS accounts are being used for such purposes.

“In most cases, the name of the sender will be completely unrelated to what’s being sent,” B. Ware said. “For example, you’ll see a label for a letter to go out with a counterfeit check for a car wrap scam, and the sender on the shipping label will be something like XYZ Biological Resources.”

But B. Ware says a year later, there is little sign that anyone is interested in acting on the shared intelligence.

“It’s so much information that they really don’t want it anymore and they’re not doing anything about it,” B. Ware said of FedEx and the USPS. “It’s almost like they’re turning a blind eye. There are so many of these checks going out each day that instead of trying to drink from the firehouse, they’re just turning their heads.”

FedEx did not respond to requests for comment. The U.S. Postal Inspection Service responded with a statement saying it “does not comment publicly on its investigative procedures and operational protocols.”

ANY METHOD THAT WORKS

Ronnie Tokazowski is a threat researcher at Agari, a security firm that has closely tracked many of the groups behind these advanced fee schemes [KrebsOnSecurity interviewed Tokazowski in 2018 after he received a security industry award for his work in this area].

Tokazowski said it’s likely the group B. Ware has infiltrated is involved in a myriad other email fraud schemes, including so-called “business email compromise” (BEC) or “CEO scams,” in which the fraudsters impersonate executives at a company in the hopes of convincing someone at the firm to wire money for payment of a non-existent invoice. According to the FBI, BEC scams netted thieves nearly $2 billion in 2020 — far more than any other type of cybercrime.

In a report released in 2019 (PDF), Agari profiled a group it dubbed “Scattered Canary” that is operating principally out of West Africa and dabbles in a dizzying array of schemes, including BEC and romance scams, FEMA and SBA loans, unemployment insurance fraud, counterfeit checks and of course money laundering.

Image: Agari.

Tokazowski said he doesn’t know if the group B. Ware is watching has any affiliation with Scattered Canary. But he said his experience with Scattered Canary shows these groups tend to make money via any and all methods that reliably produce results.

“One of the things that came out of the Scattered Canary report was that the actors we saw doing BEC scams were the same actors doing the car wrap and various Craigslist scams involving fake checks,” he said. “The people doing this type of crime will have tutorials on how to run the scam, how to wire money out for unemployment fraud, how to target people on Craigslist, and so on. It’s very different from the way a Russian hacking group might go after one industry vertical or piece of software or focus on one or two types of fraud. They will follow any method they can that works.”

Tokazowski said he’s taken his share of flack from people on social media who say his focus on West African nations as the primary source of these advanced fee and BEC scams is somehow racist [KrebsOnSecurity experienced a similar response to the 2013 stories, Spy Service Exposes Nigerian ‘Yahoo Boys’, and ‘Yahoo Boys’ Have 419 Facebook Friends].

But Tokazowski maintains he has been one of the more vocal proponents of the idea that trying to fight these problems by arresting those involved is something of a Sisyphean task, and that it makes way more sense to focus on changing the economic realities in places like Nigeria, which has been a hotbed of advanced fee activity for decades.

Nigeria has the world’s second-highest unemployment rate — rising from 27.1 percent in 2019 to 33 percent in 2020, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. The nation also is among the world’s most corrupt, according to 2020 findings from Transparency International.

“Education is definitely one piece, as raising awareness is hands down the best way to get ahead of this,” Tokazowski said. “But we also need to think about ways to create more business opportunities there so that people who are doing this to put food on the table have more legitimate opportunities. Unfortunately, thanks to the level of corruption of government officials, there are a lot of cultural reasons that fighting this type of crime at the source is going to be difficult.”

MyBook Users Urged to Unplug Devices from Internet

Hard drive giant Western Digital is urging users of its MyBook Live brand of network storage drives to disconnect them from the Internet, warning that malicious hackers are remotely wiping the drives using a critical flaw that can be triggered by anyone who knows the Internet address of an affected device.

One of many similar complaints on Western Digital’s user forum.

Earlier this week, Bleeping Computer and Ars Technica pointed to a heated discussion thread on Western Digital’s user forum where many customers complained of finding their MyBook Live and MyBook Live Duo devices completely wiped of their data.

“Western Digital has determined that some My Book Live and My Book Live Duo devices are being compromised through exploitation of a remote command execution vulnerability,” the company said in a statement June 24. “In some cases, this compromise has led to a factory reset that appears to erase all data on the device. The My Book Live and My Book Live Duo devices received its final firmware update in 2015. We understand that our customers’ data is very important. We are actively investigating the issue and will provide an updated advisory when we have more information.”

Western Digital’s brief advisory includes a link to an entry in the National Vulnerability Database for CVE-2018-18472. The NVD writeup says Western Digital WD My Book Live and WD My Book Live Duo (all versions) have a root Remote Command Execution bug.

“It can be triggered by anyone who knows the IP address of the affected device, as exploited in the wild in June 2021 for factory reset commands,” NVD wrote.

Examine the CVE attached to this flaw and you’ll notice it was issued in 2018. The NVD’s advisory credits VPN reviewer Wizcase.com with reporting the bug to Western Digital three years ago, back in June 2018.

In some ways, it’s remarkable that it took this long for vulnerable MyBook devices to be attacked: The 2018 Wizcase writeup on the flaw includes proof-of-concept code that lets anyone run commands on the devices as the all-powerful “root” user.

Western Digital’s response at the time was that the affected devices were no longer supported and that customers should avoid connecting them to the Internet. That response also suggested this bug has been present in its devices for at least a decade.

“The vulnerability report CVE-2018-18472 affects My Book Live devices originally introduced to the market between 2010 and 2012,” reads a reply from Western Digital that Wizcase posted to its blog. “These products have been discontinued since 2014 and are no longer covered under our device software support lifecycle. We encourage users who wish to continue operating these legacy products to configure their firewall to prevent remote access to these devices, and to take measures to ensure that only trusted devices on the local network have access to the device.”

A local administration page for the MyBook Live Duo.

Wizcase said the flaw it found in MyBook devices also may be present in certain models of WD MyCloud network attached storage (NAS) devices, although Western Digital’s advisory makes no mention of its MyCloud line being affected.

The vulnerable MyBook devices are popular among home users and small businesses because they’re relatively feature-rich and inexpensive, and can be upgraded with additional storage quite easily. But these products also make it simple for users to access their files remotely over the Internet using a mobile app.

I’m guessing it is primarily users who’ve configured their MyBooks to be remotely accessible who are experiencing these unfortunate drive wipes. Regardless, it’s probably safest to observe Western Digital’s advice and disconnect any MyBooks you have from ethernet access.

If you’d still like to keep your MyBook connected to your local network (at least until you can find a suitable backup for your backups), please make double sure remote access is not enabled in your device settings (see screenshot above).

How Cyber Sleuths Cracked an ATM Shimmer Gang

In 2015, police departments worldwide started finding ATMs compromised with advanced new “shimming” devices made to steal data from chip card transactions. Authorities in the United States and abroad had seized many of these shimmers, but for years couldn’t decrypt the data on the devices. This is a story of ingenuity and happenstance, and how one former Secret Service agent helped crack a code that revealed the contours of a global organized crime ring.

Jeffrey Dant was a special agent at the U.S. Secret Service for 12 years until 2015. After that, Dant served as the global lead for the fraud fusion center at Citi, one of the largest financial institutions in the United States.

Not long after joining Citi, Dant heard from industry colleagues at a bank in Mexico who reported finding one of these shimming devices inside the card acceptance slot of a local ATM. As it happens, KrebsOnSecurity wrote about that particular shimmer back in August 2015.

This card ‘shimming’ device is made to read chip-enabled cards and can be inserted directly into the ATM’s card acceptance slot.

The shimmers were an innovation that caused concern on multiple levels. For starters, chip-based payment cards were supposed to make it far more expensive and difficult for thieves to copy and clone. But these skimmers took advantage of weaknesses in the way many banks at the time implemented the new chip card standard.

Also, unlike traditional ATM skimmers that run on hidden cell phone batteries, the ATM shimmers found in Mexico did not require any external power source, and thus could remain in operation collecting card data until the device was removed.

When a chip card is inserted, a chip-capable ATM reads the data stored on the smart card by sending an electric current through the chip. Incredibly, these shimmers were able to siphon a small amount of that power (a few milliamps) to record any data transmitted by the card. When the ATM is no longer in use, the skimming device remains dormant, storing the stolen data in an encrypted format.

Dant and other investigators looking into the shimmers didn’t know at the time how the thieves who planted the devices went about gathering the stolen data. Traditional ATM skimmers are either retrieved manually, or they are programmed to transmit the stolen data wirelessly, such as via text message or Bluetooth.

But recall that these shimmers don’t have anywhere near the power needed to transmit data wirelessly, and the flexible shimmers themselves tend to rip apart when retrieved from the mouth of a compromised ATM. So how were the crooks collecting the loot?

“We didn’t know how they were getting the PINs at the time, either,” Dant recalled. “We found out later they were combining the skimmers with old school cameras hidden in fake overhead and side panels on the ATMs.”

Investigators wanted to look at the data stored on the shimmer, but it was encrypted. So they sent it to MasterCard’s forensics lab in the United Kingdom, and to the Secret Service.

“The Secret Service didn’t have any luck with it,” Dant said. “MasterCard in the U.K. was able to understand a little bit at a high level what it was doing, and they confirmed that it was powered by the chip. But the data dump from the shimmer was just encrypted gibberish.”

Organized crime gangs that specialize in deploying skimmers very often will encrypt stolen card data as a way to remove the possibility that any gang members might try to personally siphon and sell the card data in underground markets.

THE DOWNLOAD CARDS

Then in 2017, Dant got a lucky break: Investigators had found a shimming device inside an ATM in New York City, and that device appeared identical to the shimmers found in Mexico two years earlier.

“That was the first one that had showed up in the U.S. at that point,” Dant said.

The Citi team suspected that if they could work backwards from the card data that was known to have been recorded by the skimmers, they might be able to crack the encryption.

“We knew when the shimmer went into the ATM, thanks to closed-circuit television footage,” Dant said. “And we know when that shimmer was discovered. So between that time period of a couple of days, these are the cards that interacted with the skimmer, and so these card numbers are most likely on this device.”

Based off that hunch, MasterCard’s eggheads had success decoding the encrypted gibberish. But they already knew which payment cards had been compromised, so what did investigators stand to gain from breaking the encryption?

According to Dant, this is where things got interesting: They found that the same primary account number (unique 16 digits of the card) was present on the download card and on the shimmers from both New York City and Mexican ATMs.

Further research revealed that account number was tied to a payment card issued years prior by an Austrian bank to a customer who reported never receiving the card in the mail.

“So why is this Austrian bank card number on the download card and two different shimming devices in two different countries, years apart?” Dant said he wondered at the time.

He didn’t have to wait long for an answer. Soon enough, the NYPD brought a case against a group of Romanian men suspected of planting the same shimming devices in both the U.S. and Mexico. Search warrants served against the Romanian defendants turned up multiple copies of the shimmer they’d seized from the compromised ATMs.

“They found an entire ATM skimming lab that had different versions of that shimmer in untrimmed squares of sheet metal,” Dant said. “But what stood out the most was this unique device — the download card.”

The download card (right, in blue) opens an encrypted session with the shimmer, and then transmits the stolen card data to the attached white plastic device. Image: KrebsOnSecurity.com.

The download card consisted of two pieces of plastic about the width of a debit card but a bit longer. The blue plastic part — made to be inserted into a card reader — features the same contacts as a chip card. The blue plastic was attached via a ribbon cable to a white plastic card with a green LED and other electronic components.

Sticking the blue download card into a chip reader revealed the same Austrian card number seen on the shimming devices. It then became very clear what was happening.

“The download card was hard coded with chip card data on it, so that it could open up an encrypted session with the shimmer,” which also had the same card data, Dant said.

The download card, up close. Image: KrebsOnSecurity.com.

Once inserted into the mouth of ATM card acceptance slot that’s already been retrofitted with one of these shimmers, the download card causes an encrypted data exchange between it and the shimmer. Once that two-way handshake is confirmed, the white device lights up a green LED when the data transfer is complete.

THE MASTER KEY

Dant said when the Romanian crew mass-produced their shimming devices, they did so using the same stolen Austrian bank card number. What this meant was that now the Secret Service and Citi had a master key to discover the same shimming devices installed in other ATMs.

That’s because every time the gang compromised a new ATM, that Austrian account number would traverse the global payment card networks — telling them exactly which ATM had just been hacked.

“We gave that number to the card networks, and they were able to see all the places that card had been used on their networks before,” Dant said. “We also set things up so we got alerts anytime that card number popped up, and we started getting tons of alerts and finding these shimmers all over the world.”

For all their sleuthing, Dant and his colleagues never really saw shimming take off in the United States, at least nowhere near as prevalently as in Mexico, he said.

The problem was that many banks in Mexico and other parts of Latin America had not properly implemented the chip card standard, which meant thieves could use shimmed chip card data to make the equivalent of old magnetic stripe-based card transactions.

By the time the Romanian gang’s shimmers started showing up in New York City, the vast majority of U.S. banks had already properly implemented chip card processing in such a way that the same phony chip card transactions which sailed through Mexican banks would simply fail every time they were tried against U.S. institutions.

“It never took off in the U.S., but this kind of activity went on like wildfire for years in Mexico,” Dant said.

The other reason shimming never emerged as a major threat for U.S. financial institutions is that many ATMs have been upgraded over the past decade so that their card acceptance slots are far slimmer, Dant observed.

“That download card is thicker than a lot of debit cards, so a number of institutions were quick to replace the older card slots with newer hardware that reduced the height of a card slot so that you could maybe get a shimmer and a debit card, but definitely not a shimmer and one of these download cards,” he said.

Shortly after ATM shimmers started showing up at banks in Mexico, KrebsOnSecurity spent four days in Mexico tracing the activities of a Romanian organized crime gang that had very recently started its own ATM company there called Intacash.

Sources told KrebsOnSecurity that the Romanian gang also was paying technicians from competing ATM providers to retrofit cash machines with Bluetooth-based skimmers that hooked directly up to the electronics on the inside. Hooked up to the ATM’s internal power, those skimmers could collect card data indefinitely, and the data could be collected wirelessly with a smart phone.

Follow-up reporting last year by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) found Intacash and its associates compromised more than 100 ATMs across Mexico using skimmers that were able to remain in place undetected for years. The OCCRP, which dubbed the Romanian group “The Riviera Maya Gang,” estimates the crime syndicate used cloned card data and stolen PINs to steal more than $1.2 billion from bank accounts of tourists visiting the region.

Last month, Mexican authorities arrested Florian “The Shark” Tudor, Intacash’s boss and the reputed ringleader of the Romanian skimming syndicate. Authorities charged that Tudor’s group also specialized in human trafficking, which allowed them to send gang members to compromise ATMs across the border in the United States.