When Efforts to Contain a Data Breach Backfire

Earlier this month, the administrator of the cybercrime forum Breached received a cease-and-desist letter from a cybersecurity firm. The missive alleged that an auction on the site for data stolen from 10 million customers of Mexico’s second-largest bank was fake news and harming the bank’s reputation. The administrator responded to this empty threat by purchasing the stolen banking data and leaking it on the forum for everyone to download.

On August 3, 2022, someone using the alias “Holistic-K1ller” posted on Breached a thread selling data allegedly stolen from Grupo Financiero Banorte, Mexico’s second-biggest financial institution by total loans. Holistic-K1ller said the database included the full names, addresses, phone numbers, Mexican tax IDs (RFC), email addresses and balances on more than 10 million citizens.

There was no reason to believe Holistic-K1ller had fabricated their breach claim. This identity has been highly active on Breached and its predecessor RaidForums for more than two years, mostly selling databases from hacked Mexican entities. Last month, they sold customer information on 36 million customers of the Mexican phone company Telcel; in March, they sold 33,000 images of Mexican IDs — with the front picture and a selfie of each citizen. That same month, they also sold data on 1.4 million customers of Mexican lending platform Yotepresto.

But this history was either overlooked or ignored by Group-IB, the Singapore-based cybersecurity firm apparently hired by Banorte to help respond to the data breach.

“The Group-IB team has discovered a resource containing a fraudulent post offering to buy Grupo Financiero Banorte’s leaked databases,” reads a letter the Breach administrator said they received from Group-IB. “We ask you to remove this post containing Banorte data. Thank you for your cooperation and prompt attention to this urgent matter.”

The administrator of Breached is “Pompompurin,” the same individual who alerted this author in November 2021 to a glaring security hole in a U.S. Justice Department website that was used to spoof security alerts from the FBI. In a post to Breached on Aug. 8, Pompompurin said they bought the Banorte database from Hacker-K1ller’s sales thread because Group-IB was sending emails complaining about it.

“They also attempted to submit DMCA’s against the website,” Pompompurin wrote, referring to legal takedown requests under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. “Make sure to tell Banorte that now they need to worry about the data being leaked instead of just being sold.”

Banorte did not respond to requests for comment. Nor did Group-IB. But in a brief written statement picked up on Twitter, Banorte said there was no breach involving their infrastructure, and the data being sold is old.

“There has been no violation of our platforms and technological infrastructure,” Banorte said. “The set of information referred to is inaccurate and outdated, and does not put our users and customers at risk.”

That statement may be 100 percent true. Still, it is difficult to think of a better example of how not to do breach response. Banorte shrugging off this incident as a nothingburger is baffling: While it is almost certainly true that the bank balance information in the Banorte leak is now out of date, the rest of the information (tax IDs, phone numbers, email addresses) is harder to change.

“Is there one person from our community that think sending cease and desist letter to a hackers forum operator is a good idea?,” asked Ohad Zaidenberg, founder of CTI League, a volunteer emergency response community that emerged in 2020 to help fight COVID-19 related scams. “Who does it? Instead of helping, they pushed the organization from the hill.”

Kurt Seifried, director of IT for the CloudSecurityAlliance, was similarly perplexed by the response to the Banorte breach.

“If the data wasn’t real….did the bank think a cease and desist would result in the listing being removed?” Seifried wondered on Twitter. “I mean, isn’t selling breach data a worse crime usually than slander or libel? What was their thought process?”

A more typical response when a large bank suspects a breach is to approach the seller privately through an intermediary to ascertain if the information is valid and what it might cost to take it off the market. While it may seem odd to expect cybercriminals to make good on their claims to sell stolen data to only one party, removing sold stolen items from inventory is a fairly basic function of virtually all cybercriminal markets today (apart from perhaps sites that traffic in stolen identity data).

At a minimum, negotiating or simply engaging with a data seller can buy the victim organization additional time and clues with which to investigate the claim and ideally notify affected parties of a breach before the stolen data winds up online.

It is true that a large number of hacked databases put up for sale on the cybercrime underground are sold only after a small subset of in-the-know thieves have harvested all of the low-hanging fruit in the data — e.g., access to cryptocurrency accounts or user credentials that are recycled across multiple websites. And it’s certainly not unheard of for cybercriminals to go back on their word and re-sell or leak information that they have sold previously.

But companies in the throes of responding to a data security incident do themselves and customers no favors when they underestimate their adversaries, or try to intimidate cybercrooks with legal threats. Such responses generally accomplish nothing, except unnecessarily upping the stakes for everyone involved while displaying a dangerous naiveté about how the cybercrime underground works.

Detecting a Rogue Domain Controller – DCShadow Attack

In our earlier Protecting Against Active Directory DCSync Attacks blog post, we have seen how attackers can replicate permissions and completely control Active Directory (AD) infrastructure using DCSync attacks. Another devastating technique that attackers explore against AD is the DCShadow attack. It is a method of manipulating AD data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a legitimate Domain Controller (DC).

A DCShadow attack allows an attacker with domain or enterprise admin privileges to create rogue DC in the networks. Once registered, a rogue DC is used to inject domain objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas, credentials, or access keys) and replicate changes into AD infrastructure.

How Does a DCShadow Attack Work?

DCShadow attack shares similarities with the DCSync attack, which is already present in the lsadump module of an open-source tool Mimikatz. A post-exploitation attack requires domain admin or enterprise admin privileges on an endpoint. The following attack flow was demonstrated with detailed steps at the Bluehat IL 2018 conference by Vincent LE TOUX and Benjamin Delpy.

  1. Registering the DC by creating two objects in the CN=Configuration partition and altering the SPN of the computer used.
  2. Pushing the data, triggered using DrsReplicaAdd, Kerberos Credentials Collector (KCC), or other internal AD events.
  3. Removing the object previously created to demote the DC.

Attackers can perform a DCShadow attack by installing Mimikatz on a compromised Windows endpoint and starting the mimidrv service. To play the role of fake Domain Controller, an attacker can execute the following commands to register and start a service with appropriate privileges.

!+
!processtoken
token::whoami

Let us take one scenario and see how an attacker attempts a persistence attack by modifying the primaryGroupID attribute. An attacker can run the lsadump::dcshadow command to modify the value of primaryGroupID to 512.

The following command can make domain standard users be a member of the domain admin group.

lsadump::dcshadow /object:POC User5 /attribute:primaryGroupID /value:512

First, let us verify the primary group ID value before pushing AD data. As shown in the image below, we can use the net group command to verify and confirm that the user POC User5 is not part of the Admin group.

We will replicate the changes from the rogue domain controller to the legitimate one by executing the following command.

lsadump::dcshadow /push

Let us verify again net group command output. As you can see, the same user POC User5 will be part of the Domain Administrator group.

net group "Domain Admins" /domain

It is just as simple as shown above. Once an endpoint is a member of a domain administrator or privileged group, it gets higher privileges in the domain and can compromise the entire domain.

TrickBot is an example of a modular malware that used Mimikatz’s lsadump module to collect valuable information and carry out attacks, such as DCSync, DCShadow, and the Kerberos Golden Ticket compromise.

Detecting a DCShadow Attack

The DCShadow technique can avoid detections and bypass SIEM logging mechanisms since changes from a rogue DC are not captured. The technique changes or deletes replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. The SentinelOne Singularity™ Identity solution detects DCShadow attacks targeting AD and identifies suspicious user behaviors. The solution also triggers high-fidelity alerts and reports on rogue Domain Controllers that can pose a serious risk to the organization’s domain information.

Mitigation Strategies

Security administrators can examine what real or rogue DC is as a mitigation strategy. Delete the computer object that is not a genuine Domain Controller. It is also important to verify the presence of computer objects in the Domain Controller OU and nTDSDSA objects in the configuration partition of the AD.

The following investigation steps can also help security administrators to mitigate DCShadow attacks.

  • Capture network traffic and analyze the packets associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non-DC hosts.
  • Investigate Directory Service Replication (DRS) events 4928 and 4929 using Event Viewer on the DC. Observe Destination DRA and Source DRA distinguished name (DN) and validate the legitimate DN from Active Directory Users and Computers. Find out any unauthorized DRA replication between domain controllers.
  • Monitor for Mimikatz command usage, for example, lsadump::dcshadow.
  • Monitor for SPN scanning tools usage. For example, the simple command setspn -Q HTTP/* allows an attacker to find HTTP SPNs.
  • Investigate the usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs). Two types of SPNs can clearly indicate DCShadow attack. A SPN is beginning with “GC/” is associated with services by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU) and a SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2).

Conclusion

Attackers can utilize the DCShadow technique and perform more advanced attacks to establish backdoors for persistence. The organization must implement continuous monitoring solutions, regularly review system activities such as monitoring AD object creation/replication and alert the security team to take necessary mitigations.

For more information, please visit Singularity™ Identity.

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The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in Cybersecurity – Week 33

The Good

This week, the Department of Justice extradited a Russian national alleged to be an operator of an illegal cryptocurrency exchange.

In a press release, the Justice Department’s Criminal Division announced that they had extradited Alexander Vinnik, an alleged cryptocurrency money launderer, “after more than five years of litigation” from Greece back to the United States. Vinnik faces charges of owning, operating, and overseeing BTC-e, a criminal cryptocurrency exchange, and laundering over $4 billion with his associates.

According to an indictment from 2017, BTC-e enabled users to anonymously trade bitcoin, attracting cyber criminals around the world, who used these anonymous transactions to cash out their proceeds from various identity theft schemes, ransomware attacks, breaches, and incidents. These funds and criminals have been linked to fraud, identity theft, tax refund fraud schemes, public corruption, and drug trafficking.

Vinnik was charged and initially taken into custody in Greece in July 2017.  He made his first appearance in federal court this week in San Francisco.

This extradition is another major step in the Justice Department’s ongoing efforts to disrupt cyber crime, and a win for international coordination against threat actors around the world. We thank both American and Greek law enforcement officials for continuing to stand up to cyber criminals, and hope that the following investigation and trial brings answers and closures to victims impacted by criminals that used BTC-e.

The Bad

On Monday, 7-Eleven stores all over Denmark were forced to close due to an incident that impacted their cash registers and payment systems.

In a statement posted on the official 7-Eleven Denmark Facebook page, the company disclosed the cyber attack, saying it meant that “we cannot use checkouts and/or receive payment”. 7-Eleven stated that it was working with both the police and external experts to mitigate the attack. As things stand, the company does not believe any customers, partners or suppliers have been directly affected, though the situation is still fluid as the investigation continues.

While no further official updates were available at the time of writing, a Reddit user claiming to be a 7-Eleven employee based in Strøget, Denmark appeared to corroborate the details, saying the checkout systems were not working, and that because 7-Eleven stores “run with the same system,” they were forced to close. The reddit post has since been deleted.

This incident is a sobering reminder that enterprises need to regularly evaluate and deploy security systems that can provide full visiblity across their environments and proactively identify threats before they cause widespread outages.

The Ugly

VMware users are being warned about multiple vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker to cause some serious damage to an organization’s environment.

In a recent security advisory, VMware warned users about a critical authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2022-31656) affecting VMware Workspace ONE Access, Identity Manager, and vRealize Automation. Researchers believe that the bug could allow an attacker to gain administrative access and form an attack chain by exploiting other remote code execution (RCE) flaws. The researcher behind CVE-2022-31656 followed up this week with a detailed explanation of the vulnerability.

POC by Petrus Viet

VMware has issued updates to address CVE-2022-31656 and eight additional vulnerabilities, including CVE-2022-31658, a JDBC injection vulnerability that allows a threat actor with administrator and network access to execute remote code, CVE-2022-31659, a SQL injection RCE vulnerability, CVE-2022-31665, another RCE vulnerability, three privilege escalation vulnerabilities (CVE-2022-31660, CVE-2022-31661, and CVE-2022-31664), a URL injection vulnerability (CVE-2022-31657), and a path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2022-31662), both rated as moderate.

This string of security flaws drives home the severe damage that attack chains can pose when a cyber criminal gains administrative access to targeted environments. In light of this string of security flaws, it’s crucial that enterprises using VMware products listed here take immediate mitigation action.

Sounding the Alarm on Emergency Alert System Flaws

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is urging states and localities to beef up security around proprietary devices that connect to the Emergency Alert System — a national public warning system used to deliver important emergency information, such as severe weather and AMBER alerts. The DHS warning came in advance of a workshop to be held this weekend at the DEFCON security conference in Las Vegas, where a security researcher is slated to demonstrate multiple weaknesses in the nationwide alert system.

A Digital Alert Systems EAS encoder/decoder that Pyle said he acquired off eBay in 2019. It had the username and password for the system printed on the machine.

The DHS warning was prompted by security researcher Ken Pyle, a partner at security firm Cybir. Pyle said he started acquiring old EAS equipment off of eBay in 2019, and that he quickly identified a number of serious security vulnerabilities in a device that is broadly used by states and localities to encode and decode EAS alert signals.

“I found all kinds of problems back then, and reported it to the DHS, FBI and the manufacturer,” Pyle said in an interview with KrebsOnSecurity. “But nothing ever happened. I decided I wasn’t going to tell anyone about it yet because I wanted to give people time to fix it.”

Pyle said he took up the research again in earnest after an angry mob stormed the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021.

“I was sitting there thinking, ‘Holy shit, someone could start a civil war with this thing,”’ Pyle recalled. “I went back to see if this was still a problem, and it turns out it’s still a very big problem. So I decided that unless someone actually makes this public and talks about it, clearly nothing is going to be done about it.”

The EAS encoder/decoder devices Pyle acquired were made by Lyndonville, NY-based Digital Alert Systems (formerly Monroe Electronics, Inc.), which issued a security advisory this month saying it released patches in 2019 to fix the flaws reported by Pyle, but that some customers are still running outdated versions of the device’s firmware. That may be because the patches were included in version 4 of the firmware for the EAS devices, and many older models apparently do not support the new software.

“The vulnerabilities identified present a potentially serious risk, and we believe both were addressed in software updates issued beginning Oct 2019,” EAS said in a written statement. “We also provided attribution for the researcher’s responsible disclosure, allowing us to rectify the matters before making any public statements. We are aware that some users have not taken corrective actions and updated their software and should immediately take action to update the latest software version to ensure they are not at risk. Anything lower than version 4.1 should be updated immediately. On July 20, 2022, the researcher referred to other potential issues, and we trust the researcher will provide more detail. We will evaluate and work to issue any necessary mitigations as quickly as possible.”

But Pyle said a great many EAS stakeholders are still ignoring basic advice from the manufacturer, such as changing default passwords and placing the devices behind a firewall, not directly exposing them to the Internet, and restricting access only to trusted hosts and networks.

Pyle, in a selfie that is heavily redacted because the EAS device behind him had its user credentials printed on the lid.

Pyle said the biggest threat to the security of the EAS is that an attacker would only need to compromise a single EAS station to send out alerts locally that can be picked up by other EAS systems and retransmitted across the nation.

“The process for alerts is automated in most cases, hence, obtaining access to a device will allow you to pivot around,” he said. “There’s no centralized control of the EAS because these devices are designed such that someone locally can issue an alert, but there’s no central control over whether I am the one person who can send or whatever. If you are a local operator, you can send out nationwide alerts. That’s how easy it is to do this.”

One of the Digital Alert Systems devices Pyle sourced from an electronics recycler earlier this year was non-functioning, but whoever discarded it neglected to wipe the hard drive embedded in the machine. Pyle soon discovered the device contained the private cryptographic keys and other credentials needed to send alerts through Comcast, the nation’s third-largest cable company.

“I can issue and create my own alert here, which has all the valid checks or whatever for being a real alert station,” Pyle said in an interview earlier this month. “I can create a message that will start propagating through the EAS.”

Comcast told KrebsOnSecurity that “a third-party device used to deliver EAS alerts was lost in transit by a trusted shipping provider between two Comcast locations and subsequently obtained by a cybersecurity researcher.

“We’ve conducted a thorough investigation of this matter and have determined that no customer data, and no sensitive Comcast data, were compromised,” Comcast spokesperson David McGuire said.

The company said it also confirmed that the information included on the device can no longer be used to send false messages to Comcast customers or used to compromise devices within Comcast’s network, including EAS devices.

“We are taking steps to further ensure secure transfer of such devices going forward,” McGuire said. “Separately, we have conducted a thorough audit of all EAS devices on our network and confirmed that they are updated with currently available patches and are therefore not vulnerable to recently reported security issues. We’re grateful for the responsible disclosure and to the security research community for continuing to engage and share information with our teams to make our products and technologies ever more secure. Mr. Pyle informed us promptly of his research and worked with us as we took steps to validate his findings and ensure the security of our systems.”

The user interface for an EAS device.

Unauthorized EAS broadcast alerts have happened enough that there is a chronicle of EAS compromises over at fandom.com. Thankfully, most of these incidents have involved fairly obvious hoaxes.

According to the EAS wiki, in February 2013, hackers broke into the EAS networks in Great Falls, Mt. and Marquette, Mich. to broadcast an alert that zombies had risen from their graves in several counties. In Feb. 2017, an EAS station in Indiana also was hacked, with the intruders playing the same “zombies and dead bodies” audio from the 2013 incidents.

“On February 20 and February 21, 2020, Wave Broadband’s EASyCAP equipment was hacked due to the equipment’s default password not being changed,” the Wiki states. “Four alerts were broadcasted, two of which consisted of a Radiological Hazard Warning and a Required Monthly Test playing parts of the Hip Hop song Hot by artist Young Thug.”

In January 2018, Hawaii sent out an alert to cell phones, televisions and radios, warning everyone in the state that a missile was headed their way. It took 38 minutes for Hawaii to let people know the alert was a misfire, and that a draft alert was inadvertently sent. The news video clip below about the 2018 event in Hawaii does a good job of walking through how the EAS works.

Day 2 of Black Hat USA | People vs. Cybersecurity – Exploring Enhanced Email Protection and Surveillance Abuse

Las Vegas, have you been enjoying this year’s Black Hat USA event so far? The SentinelOne team is pumped to enter our second day with you both in person, and virtually. Each year, Black Hat brings security researchers and defenders, hackers and cyber enthusiasts all together for a week of intensive training, cutting-edge technical briefs, and interactive demos and business halls. We like to say that there’s something for everyone at an event like this!

On Day One of Black Hat 2022, we unveiled a new partnership with asset intelligence company, Armis, launched our latest autonomous solution, XDR Ingest, and hosted two threat research sessions focused on data-focused security and the realities of cyber war. For today’s blog, we’ll cover Day Two of our time here and share all the details about special announcements and speaker sessions so you don’t miss a thing.

Event Announcements

SentinelOne Integrates with Proofpoint for Enhanced Ransomware Protection

We are pleased to announce a new integration with SentinelOne Singularity XDR and Proofpoint’s Targeted Attack Protection (TAP) security solution. With this integration, enterprises receive multi-layered detection and response from email to endpoint, cloud, and identity management, protecting both your greatest assets and risks: your people. Proofpoint TAP offers unique visibility into email-based threats and streams data to the SentinelOne Singularity XDR platform for defense-in-depth protection.

According to recent Proofpoint research, 83% of organizations experienced at least one successful email-based phishing attack in 2021 alone. With threats coming from various sources, threat actors continue to target the weakest link they can find – humans. The integration aligns Proofpoint and SentinelOne together to solve this problem by securing email inboxes and preventing threats associated with their users.

For more information, visit www.sentinelone.com. You can also learn more about Proofpoint’s people-centric solutions at www.proofpoint.com.

Event Highlights

Catch our final industry-leading threat research session at Black Hat today!

“Charged by an Elephant – An APT Fabricating Evidence to Throw You in Jail”

SentinelOne Speakers: Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade, Tom Hegel
Where: South Pacific F (Level 1)
When: Thursday, August 11, 3:20pm-4:00pm

Session Summary: It’s easy to forget the human cost of state-sponsored threats operating with impunity. While we often think of espionage, intellectual property theft, or financial gain as the objectives of these cyber operations, there’s a far more insidious motivation that flies under the radar – APTs fabricating evidence to frame and incarcerate vulnerable opponents. This talk focuses on the activities of ModifiedElephant, a threat actor operating for at least a decade with ties to the commercial surveillance industry. This cluster of activity represents a critically underreported dimension of how technology can be abused to silence critics.

Congrats to both Juan Andres and Tom for a great turn out at yesterday’s sessions!

Catch the S1 Team Before You Go!

It’s the final day at this year’s Black Hat so stop by the SentinelOne booth (#1120) before the day is out. Whether you’d like to chat more about our collaborations with Armis and Proofpoint or get a live demo of our new XDR Ingest solution, we’d love to connect with you. There’s still time to schedule a meeting with our executives and R&D squad here.

And, as always, we’ve got lots of event swag to giveaway too! Make sure you come visit us and pick up your exclusive, S1-branded Black Hat t-shirt and more.

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It Might Be Our Data, But It’s Not Our Breach

Image: Shutterstock.

A cybersecurity firm says it has intercepted a large, unique stolen data set containing the names, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, Social Security Numbers and dates of birth on nearly 23 million Americans. The firm’s analysis of the data suggests it corresponds to current and former customers of AT&T. The telecommunications giant stopped short of saying the data wasn’t theirs, but it maintains the records do not appear to have come from its systems and may be tied to a previous data incident at another company.

Milwaukee-based cybersecurity consultancy Hold Security said it intercepted a 1.6 gigabyte compressed file on a popular dark web file-sharing site. The largest item in the archive is a 3.6 gigabyte file called “dbfull,” and it contains 28.5 million records, including 22.8 million unique email addresses and 23 million unique SSNs. There are no passwords in the database.

Hold Security founder Alex Holden said a number of patterns in the data suggest it relates to AT&T customers. For starters, email addresses ending in “att.net” accounted for 13.7 percent of all addresses in the database, with addresses from SBCGLobal.net and Bellsouth.net — both AT&T companies — making up another seven percent. In contrast, Gmail users made up more than 30 percent of the data set, with Yahoo addresses accounting for 24 percent. More than 10,000 entries in the database list “none@att.com” in the email field.

Hold Security found these email domains account for 87% of all domains in the data set. Nearly 21% belonged to AT&T customers.

Holden’s team also examined the number of email records that included an alias in the username portion of the email, and found 293 email addresses with plus addressing. Of those, 232 included an alias that indicated the customer had signed up at some AT&T property; 190 of the aliased email addresses were “+att@”; 42 were “+uverse@,” an oddly specific reference to a DirecTV/AT&T entity that included broadband Internet. In September 2016, AT&T rebranded U-verse as AT&T Internet.

According to its website, AT&T Internet is offered in 21 states, including Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas and Wisconsin. Nearly all of the records in the database that contain a state designation corresponded to those 21 states; all other states made up just 1.64 percent of the records, Hold Security found.

Image: Hold Security.

The vast majority of records in this database belong to consumers, but almost 13,000 of the entries are for corporate entities. Holden said 387 of those corporate names started with “ATT,” with various entries like “ATT PVT XLOW” appearing 81 times. And most of the addresses for these entities are AT&T corporate offices.

How old is this data? One clue may be in the dates of birth exposed in this database. There are very few records in this file with dates of birth after 2000.

“Based on these statistics, we see that the last significant number of subscribers born in March of 2000,” Holden told KrebsOnSecurity, noting that AT&T requires new account holders to be 18 years of age or older. “Therefore, it makes sense that the dataset was likely created close to March of 2018.”

There was also this anomaly: Holden said one of his analysts is an AT&T customer with a 13-letter last name, and that her AT&T bill has always had the same unique misspelling of her surname (they added yet another letter). He said the analyst’s name is identically misspelled in this database.

KrebsOnSecurity shared the large data set with AT&T, as well as Hold Security’s analysis of it. AT&T ultimately declined to say whether all of the people in the database are or were at some point AT&T customers. The company said the data appears to be several years old, and that “it’s not immediately possible to determine the percentage that may be customers.”

“This information does not appear to have come from our systems,” AT&T said in a written statement. “It may be tied to a previous data incident at another company. It is unfortunate that data can continue to surface over several years on the dark web. However, customers often receive notices after such incidents, and advice for ID theft is consistent and can be found online.”

The company declined to elaborate on what they meant by “a previous data incident at another company.”

But it seems likely that this database is related to one that went up for sale on a hacker forum on August 19, 2021. That auction ran with the title “AT&T Database +70M (SSN/DOB),” and was offered by ShinyHunters, a well-known threat actor with a long history of compromising websites and developer repositories to steal credentials or API keys.

Image: BleepingComputer

ShinyHunters established the starting price for the auction at $200,000, but set the “flash” or “buy it now” price at $1 million. The auction also included a small sampling of the stolen information, but that sample is no longer available. The hacker forum where the ShinyHunters sales thread existed was seized by the FBI in April, and its alleged administrator arrested.

But cached copies of the auction, as recorded by cyber intelligence firm Intel 471, show ShinyHunters received bids of up to $230,000 for the entire database before they suspended the sale.

“This thread has been deleted several times,” ShinyHunters wrote in their auction discussion on Sept. 6, 2021. “Therefore, the auction is suspended. AT&T will be available on WHM as soon as they accept new vendors.”

The WHM initialism was a reference to the White House Market, a dark web marketplace that shut down in October 2021.

“In many cases, when a database is not sold, ShinyHunters will release it for free on hacker forums,” wrote BleepingComputer’s Lawrence Abrams, who broke the news of the auction last year and confronted AT&T about the hackers’ claims.

AT&T gave Abrams a similar statement, saying the data didn’t come from their systems.

“When asked whether the data may have come from a third-party partner, AT&T chose not to speculate,” Abrams wrote. “‘Given this information did not come from us, we can’t speculate on where it came from or whether it is valid,’” AT&T told BleepingComputer.

Asked to respond to AT&T’s denial, ShinyHunters told BleepingComputer at the time, “I don’t care if they don’t admit. I’m just selling.”

On June 1, 2022, a 21-year-old Frenchman was arrested in Morocco for allegedly being a member of ShinyHunters. Databreaches.net reports the defendant was arrested on an Interpol “Red Notice” at the request of a U.S. federal prosecutor from Washington state.

Databreaches.net suggests the warrant could be tied to a ShinyHunters theft in May 2020, when the group announced they had exfiltrated 500 GB of Microsoft’s source code from Microsoft’s private GitHub repositories.

“Researchers assess that Shiny Hunters gained access to roughly 1,200 private repositories around March 28, 2020, which have since been secured,” reads a May 2020 alert posted by the New Jersey Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Cell, a component within the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness.

“Though the breach was largely dismissed as insignificant, some images of the directory listing appear to contain source code for Azure, Office, and some Windows runtimes, and concerns have been raised regarding access to private API keys or passwords that may have been mistakenly included in some private repositories,” the alert continues. “Additionally, Shiny Hunters is flooding dark web marketplaces with breached databases.”

Last month, T-Mobile agreed to pay $350 million to settle a consolidated class action lawsuit over a breach in 2021 that affected 40 million current and former customers. The breach came to light on Aug. 16, 2021, when someone starting selling tens of millions of SSN/DOB records from T-Mobile on the same hacker forum where the ShinyHunters would post their auction for the claimed AT&T database just three days later.

T-Mobile has not disclosed many details about the “how” of last year’s breach, but it said the intruder(s) “leveraged their knowledge of technical systems, along with specialized tools and capabilities, to gain access to our testing environments and then used brute force attacks and other methods to make their way into other IT servers that included customer data.”

A sales thread tied to the stolen T-Mobile customer data.

Day 1 of Black Hat USA 2022 | Asset Intel, Data-Focused Security & the Realities of Cyber War

Hello, Las Vegas! We’re so excited to be in town again for the 25th annual Black Hat USA event! The main conference, spanning August 10 and 11, is a hybrid event this year, offering both virtual and in-person activities for its attendees. Black Hat invites hackers, researchers, security gurus, and anyone interested in cybersecurity to two full days of leading-edge briefings, exclusive demos from developers, and business halls encouraging you to bump shoulders with fellow defenders and experts from the InfoSec community.

Like years before, Black Hat 2022 is sure to be packed with the latest in cyber training, trends, research, development, and thought leadership. Here’s our guide to make sure that you’re up to date with the event agenda so you don’t miss out on anything essential.

Event Announcements

SentinelOne Partners with Armis for Unparalleled Asset Intelligence

The SentinelOne team is pleased to announce our new partnership with Armis, a leading platform specializing in providing unified asset intelligence. In this collaboration, our organizations aim to protect businesses from modern threats and ensure unmatched visibility and risk reduction across endpoints, cloud, mobile, IoT, OT devices, and more.

When it comes to security operations, context, visibility, and coverage are absolutely vital in reducing your attack surface, even as networks become more complex. We’re proud to say that this partnership will help mitigate the unique challenges of asset visibility and control, particularly in the healthcare, manufacturing, and critical infrastructure verticals.

For more information on our partnership with Armis, check out www.s1.ai/marketplace and www.armis.com/sentinelone/.

SentinelOne Unveils XDR Ingest to Transform Data-Defined Cybersecurity

Today, SentinelOne proudly unveils XDR Ingest, a disruptive step in the journey to democratizing XDR. XDR Ingest provides our customers with a limitless data platform to ingest, retain, correlate, search, and action all enterprise security data from any source, in both real-time and historical search.

Together with Singularity XDR, XDR Ingest offsets the cost of log storage and eliminates unnecessary data duplication. As organizations continue to bolster their XDR strategies, XDR Ingest helps organizations overcome the costs and limitations of traditional SIEM and log management products.

Learn more about our launch of XDR Ingest at Black Hat by visiting the SentinelOne booth (#1120) or by requesting a demo at https://www.sentinelone.com/.

Event Highlights

Gift cards are king. We’re giving away $25 gift cards all week for this event! Claim yours in three easy steps:

  1. Take a selfie with any SentinelOne branding you see outside of the Expo Hall.
  2. Post it on your socials with the hashtags #S1BlackHat22 and #BHUSA.
  3. Visit booth #1120 and get your badge stamped.

The first 200 attendees who show us their posts will walk away with one gift card just for them. We’ll be waiting!

Come visit or tune into our industry-leading threat research sessions.

“Scaling SOC and IR Teams to Defend Kubernetes Based Workloads”

SentinelOne Speakers: Lance Knittig, Chris Boehm
Where: Mandalay Bay 1
When: Wednesday, August 10, 11:30am-12:20pm

Learn more

“Real ‘Cyber War’: Espionage, DDoS, Leaks, & Wipers in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”

SentinelOne Speakers: Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade, Tom Hegel
Where: Islander EI (Level 1)
When: Wednesday, August 10, 3:20pm-4:00pm

Learn more

“Charged by an Elephant – An APT Fabricating Evidence to Throw You in Jail”

SentinelOne Speakers: Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade, Tom Hegel
Where: South Pacific F (Level 1)
When: Thursday, August 11, 3:20pm-4:00pm

Learn more

Work hard, play hard. Team SentinelOne is bringing the party to you!

Hazel Lounge Takeover with Armis & Torq

Where: Hazel Lounge (Mandalay Bay by the main elevators)
When: Wednesday, August 10, 4:00pm-9:00pm

Register here

Level Up Premiere After Party with ZeroFox and more!

Where: Skyfall Lounge, Delano Hotel
When: Wednesday, August 10, 8:00pm to midnight

Register here

Let’s Meet at Black Hat

There’s something for everyone at Black Hat USA. Whether you’re going to learn about cutting-edge research and trends, looking for thought leadership and expert advice on circulating cyber issues, or trying to build up your InfoSec social network, we’re excited to meet you there.

Swing by booth #1120 and chat with the SentinelOne team about all things security and how you’re ready to get the only answer to the latest threats in the cyber landscape. With autonomous endpoint protection, start preventing the threats you’re learning about this week. Schedule a meeting with our executives and R&D squad to meet us at Black Hat!

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The Security Pros and Cons of Using Email Aliases

One way to tame your email inbox is to get in the habit of using unique email aliases when signing up for new accounts online. Adding a “+” character after the username portion of your email address — followed by a notation specific to the site you’re signing up at — lets you create an infinite number of unique email addresses tied to the same account. Aliases can help users detect breaches and fight spam. But not all websites allow aliases, and they can complicate account recovery. Here’s a look at the pros and cons of adopting a unique alias for each website.

What is an email alias? When you sign up at a site that requires an email address, think of a word or phrase that represents that site for you, and then add that prefaced by a “+” sign just to the left of the “@” sign in your email address. For instance, if I were signing up at example.com, I might give my email address as krebsonsecurity+example@gmail.com. Then, I simply go back to my inbox and create a corresponding folder called “Example,” along with a new filter that sends any email addressed to that alias to the Example folder.

Importantly, you don’t ever use this alias anywhere else. That way, if anyone other than example.com starts sending email to it, it is reasonable to assume that example.com either shared your address with others or that it got hacked and relieved of that information. Indeed, security-minded readers have often alerted KrebsOnSecurity about spam to specific aliases that suggested a breach at some website, and usually they were right, even if the company that got hacked didn’t realize it at the time.

Alex Holden, founder of the Milwaukee-based cybersecurity consultancy Hold Security, said many threat actors will scrub their distribution lists of any aliases because there is a perception that these users are more security- and privacy-focused than normal users, and are thus more likely to report spam to their aliased addresses.

Holden said freshly-hacked databases also are often scrubbed of aliases before being sold in the underground, meaning the hackers will simply remove the aliased portion of the email address.

“I can tell you that certain threat groups have rules on ‘+*@’ email address deletion,” Holden said. “We just got the largest credentials cache ever — 1 billion new credentials to us — and most of that data is altered, with aliases removed. Modifying credential data for some threat groups is normal. They spend time trying to understand the database structure and removing any red flags.”

According to the breach tracking site HaveIBeenPwned.com, only about .03 percent of the breached records in circulation today include an alias.

Email aliases are rare enough that seeing just a few email addresses with the same alias in a breached database can make it trivial to identify which company likely got hacked and leaked said database. That’s because the most common aliases are simply the name of the website where the signup takes place, or some abbreviation or shorthand for it.

Hence, for a given database, if there are more than a handful of email addresses that have the same alias, the chances are good that whatever company or website corresponds to that alias has been hacked.

That might explain the actions of Allekabels, a large Dutch electronics web shop that suffered a data breach in 2021. Allekabels said a former employee had stolen data on 5,000 customers, and that those customers were then informed about the data breach by Allekabels.

But Dutch publication RTL Nieuws said it obtained a copy of the Allekabels user database from a hacker who was selling information on 3.6 million customers at the time, and found that the 5,000 number cited by the retailer corresponded to the number of customers who’d signed up using an alias. In essence, RTL argued, the company had notified only those most likely to notice and complain that their aliased addresses were suddenly receiving spam.

“RTL Nieuws has called more than thirty people from the database to check the leaked data,” the publication explained. “The customers with such a unique email address have all received a message from Allekabels that their data has been leaked – according to Allekabels they all happened to be among the 5000 data that this ex-employee had stolen.”

HaveIBeenPwned’s Hunt arrived at the conclusion that aliases account for about .03 percent of registered email addresses by studying the data leaked in the 2013 breach at Adobe, which affected at least 38 million users. Allekabels’s ratio of aliased users was considerably higher than Adobe’s — .14 percent — but then again European Internet users tend to be more privacy-conscious.

While overall adoption of email aliases is still quite low, that may be changing. Apple customers who use iCloud to sign up for new accounts online automatically are prompted to use Apple’s Hide My Email feature, which creates the account using a unique email address that automatically forwards to a personal inbox.

What are the downsides to using email aliases, apart from the hassle of setting them up? The biggest downer is that many sites won’t let you use a “+” sign in your email address, even though this functionality is clearly spelled out in the email standard.

Also, if you use aliases, it helps to have a reliable mnemonic to remember the alias used for each account (this is a non-issue if you create a new folder or rule for each alias). That’s because knowing the email address for an account is generally a prerequisite for resetting the account’s password, and if you can’t remember the alias you added way back when you signed up, you may have limited options for recovering access to that account if you at some point forget your password.

What about you, Dear Reader? Do you rely on email aliases? If so, have they been useful? Did I neglect to mention any pros or cons? Feel free to sound off in the comments below.

Microsoft Patch Tuesday, August 2022 Edition

Microsoft today released updates to fix a record 141 security vulnerabilities in its Windows operating systems and related software. Once again, Microsoft is patching a zero-day vulnerability in the Microsoft Support Diagnostics Tool (MSDT), a service built into Windows. Redmond also addressed multiple flaws in Exchange Server — including one that was disclosed publicly prior to today — and it is urging organizations that use Exchange for email to update as soon as possible and to enable additional protections.

In June, Microsoft patched a vulnerability in MSDT dubbed “Follina” that had been used in active attacks for at least three months prior. This latest MSDT bug — CVE-2022-34713 — is a remote code execution flaw that requires convincing a target to open a booby-trapped file, such as an Office document. Microsoft this month also issued a different patch for another MSDT flaw, tagged as CVE-2022-35743.

The publicly disclosed Exchange flaw is CVE-2022-30134, which is an information disclosure weakness. Microsoft also released fixes for three other Exchange flaws that rated a “critical” label, meaning they could be exploited remotely to compromise the system and with no help from users. Microsoft says addressing some of the Exchange vulnerabilities fixed this month requires administrators to enable Windows Extended protection on Exchange Servers. See Microsoft’s blog post on the Exchange Server updates for more details.

“If your organization runs local exchange servers, this trio of CVEs warrant an urgent patch,” said Kevin Breen, director of cyber threat research for Immerse Labs. “Exchanges can be treasure troves of information, making them valuable targets for attackers. With CVE-2022-24477, for example, an attacker can gain initial access to a user’s host and could take over the mailboxes for all exchange users, sending and reading emails and documents. For attackers focused on Business Email Compromise this kind of vulnerability can be extremely damaging.”

The other two critical Exchange bugs are tracked as CVE-2022-24516 and CVE-2022-21980. It’s difficult to believe it’s only been a little more than a year since malicious hackers worldwide pounced in a bevy of zero-day Exchange vulnerabilities to remotely compromise the email systems for hundreds of thousands of organizations running Exchange Server locally for email. That lingering catastrophe is reminder enough that critical Exchange bugs deserve immediate attention.

The SANS Internet Storm Center‘s rundown on Patch Tuesday warns that a critical remote code execution bug in the Windows Point-to-Point Protocol (CVE-2022-30133) could become “wormable” — a threat capable of spreading across a network without any user interaction.

“Another critical vulnerability worth mentioning is an elevation of privilege affecting Active Directory Domain Services (CVE-2022-34691),” SANS wrote. “According to the advisory, ‘An authenticated user could manipulate attributes on computer accounts they own or manage, and acquire a certificate from Active Directory Certificate Services that would allow elevation of privilege to System.’ A system is vulnerable only if Active Directory Certificate Services is running on the domain. The CVSS for this vulnerability is 8.8.”

Breen highlighted a set of four vulnerabilities in Visual Studio that earned Microsoft’s less-dire “important” rating but that nevertheless could be vitally important for the security of developer systems.

“Developers are empowered with access to API keys and deployment pipelines that, if compromised, could be significantly damaging to organizations,” he said. “So it’s no surprise they are often targeted by more advanced attackers. Patches for their tools should not be overlooked. We’re seeing a continued trend of supply-chain compromise too, making it vital that we ensure developers, and their tools, are kept up-to-date with the same rigor we apply to standard updates.”

Greg Wiseman, product manager at Rapid7, pointed to an interesting bug Microsoft patched in Windows Hello, the biometric authentication mechanism for Windows 10.  Microsoft notes that the successful exploitation of the weakness requires physical access to the target device, but would allow an attacker to bypass a facial recognition check.

Wiseman said despite the record number of vulnerability fixes from Redmond this month, the numbers are slightly less dire.

“20 CVEs affect their Chromium-based Edge browser and 34 affect Azure Site Recovery (up from 32 CVEs affecting that product last month),” Wiseman wrote. “As usual, OS-level updates will address a lot of these, but note that some extra configuration is required to fully protect Exchange Server this month.”

As it often does on Patch Tuesday, Adobe has also released security updates for many of its products, including Acrobat and Reader, Adobe Commerce and Magento Open Source. More details here.

Please consider backing up your system or at least your important documents and data before applying system updates. And if you run into any problems with these updates, please drop a note about it here in the comments.

LABScon | Security Research in Real Time – Talks Not To Miss, Part Two

This is a continuation of our deep-dive into the inaugural LABScon 2022 agenda to shine a spotlight on the can’t-miss presentations on deck in Scottsdale in September.

LABScon will feature talks from various adjacent fields in InfoSec. From vulnerabilities to malicious browser extensions, Chinese APTs, and novel uses of machine learning to detect malicious activities, the agenda is packed with thought provoking content for researchers on the bleeding edge. LABScon 2022 will feature a complimentary track with expert workshops on analyzing Android malware, malware analysis with Ghidra, and more.

As the anticipation builds, we are excited to share our stage with speakers from the International Red Cross, Mandiant, Proofpoint, Cisco Talos, and our own SentinelOne research teams. In this post, we highlight a few more of the talks we can’t wait to host at LABScon.

Are Digital Technologies Eroding the Principle of Distinction in War? – Mauro Vignati (International Committee Of The Red Cross)


Until now, the cyber capabilities of a State have been assessed mainly on technical and tactical perspectives. But describing cyber operations is no longer sufficient to understand the capabilities that States deploy in the digital sphere during armed conflicts. It has been observed that States can gain a major advantage thanks to the digital transformation of societies, this is because armies in conflict are increasingly digitized as are the involved populations. Some prescient examples: States may encourage civilians to engage in offensive cyber operations against targets associated with the enemy or the transformation and consequently the dual use of smartphone applications “enhanced” to encourage users to contribute to the military effort.

Civilians have been used to perform military functions during armed conflicts and to assist in the war effort since time immemorial. With the digitalisation of societies, we are witnessing fundamental shifts both in terms of quality and quantity. The main qualitative shift is that these activities are now much closer to the actual conduct of military operations: we have moved from the provision of food, shelter, or equipment at some distance from the physical battlefield to the direct contribution to the operations on the digital battlefield and as support to kinetic operations. The main quantitative shift is that in the digital space it is much easier to scale up these activities. Encouraging civilian participation in cyber hostilities raises several concerns, first of all it undermines the central humanitarian value that undergirds the principle of distinction (between civilians and combatants), namely the protection of those who must be spared from the effects of the conflict. Encouraging individuals to fight as civilians will inevitably lead to more civilian casualties as combatants struggle to distinguish the fighters amongst the civilians.

UNC788: Wild Kittens and Where to Find Them – Ashley Zaya & Emiel Haeghebaert (Mandiant)


Charming Kitten, Phosphorus, TA453, and UNC788. You’ve heard these names before, but who and what are they, and where can you find them? In this session, Mandiant analysts Emiel Haeghebaert and Ashley Zaha will talk about UNC788, a cluster of threat activity that conducts cyber espionage and credential harvesting on behalf of the Iranian government. UNC788 is characterized by credential theft operations against corporate and personal email accounts and has consistently targeted Western think tanks and academics, current and former government officials, members of the Iranian diaspora in the United Kingdom, Israel, and the United States, as well as high-profile individuals within Iran.

This presentation promises to touch on the history of the group and, drawing on recent use cases, will illustrate how to leverage and turn the group’s bad habits and infrastructure patterns into reliable threat hunting techniques. It will cover how different third-party tools, like Censys, DomainTools, PassiveTotal, and VirusTotal are leveraged to identify new infrastructure in real time as well as changes in techniques over time. Attendance at this session will result in actionable takeaways for threat intelligence analysts!

Star-Gazing: Using A Full Galaxy of YARA Methods to Pursue an Apex Actor – Greg Lesnewich (Proofpoint)


This talk will explore a highly regarded but rarely publicly investigated threat actor, malware similarity, and YARA. Publicly available data yields just a generic AV signature with the actor’s name.

Using YARA as an analyzer with the console output, and a teeny bit of Python to develop a malware similarity methodology, we will highlight just how well our beloved YARA can pursue a true apex predator.

Quiver – Using Cutting Edge ML to Detect Interesting Command Lines for Hunters – Dean Langsam & Gal Braun (SentinelOne)


What do GPT3, DALL-E2, and Copilot have in common? By grasping the structure and nature of language, these projects can generate text, images, and code that provide added value to a user.  Now, they even understand command lines!

Quiver – QUick Verifier for Threat HuntER is an application aimed at understanding command lines and performing tasks like Attribution, Classification, Anomaly Detection, and many others.

DALL-E2 is known to take an input prompt in human language and draw a stunning image with impressive matching results; GPT3 and similar projects can create an infinite amount of text seemingly written by a real person; While Github’s Copilot can generate entire functions from a comment string.

Command lines are a language in themselves and can be taught and learned the same way other languages can. And the application can be as versatile as we want. Imagine giving a command line to an input prompt and getting the probability of it being a reverse shell, by an Iranian actor, or maybe used for cybercrime. A single prompt on its own may not help so much, but with the power of language models algorithms, the threat hunter can have millions of answers in a matter of minutes, shedding a light on the most important or urgent activities within the network.

In this session, we’ll demonstrate how we developed such a model, along with real-world examples of how the model is used in applications like anomaly detection, attribution, and classification.

Malshare: 10 Years Of Running a Public Malware Repository – Silas Cutler (Stairwell)


Since March 2013, alongside a handful of volunteers, I have run a fully public, never-for-profit malware repository named MalShare. The site allows anyone to register and immediately have access to our entire collection of malware samples.

When MalShare first launched, the idea of openly sharing malware was highly controversial; I was told the site would never survive against existing commercial options and the site would only serve to give threat actors deeper insight into defender visibility. Nearly ten years later, we’re still online. What started out as a handful of open web directories has grown into a service used by thousands of researchers and integrated into numerous tools.

Android Malware Analysis: From Triage to RE (Workshop) – Vitor Ventura (Cisco Talos)


Android malware is packing anti-analysis and anti-debug techniques. This workshop will provide the attendees with the knowledge to apply and adapt techniques aimed at bypassing such protections.

This is a full hands on workshop designed to provide the attendees with the knowledge to bypass the most common techniques used by malware to prevent analysis. During the workshop no automated tools will be used for analysis. The objective is that the attendees understand how they can use techniques like instrumentation and patching to help them analyze and bypass malware defenses when the automated tools fail, while using only free and open source tools.

Request an Invite

There are still a limited number of tickets available, so if you haven’t yet requested your invite, now is the time to push that button.